Atathakr
Wednesday, December 15, 2010
More Ramblings on Faith
Thursday, December 2, 2010
Post-Election Thoughts (Ikhwan Edition!)
Saturday, November 20, 2010
The Stresses of Cairo
Thursday, October 28, 2010
Palestine and Anti-Semitism
I'm generally really, really reluctant to make any sort of commentary on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Arguing about it is like arguing about moral issues, where there is very, very little ground for compromise because of the ideological underpinning of both sides. I consider it a policy issue, and do not consider myself pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian. The concept of being pro-either side is fairly repugnant to me, since the two notions are convoluted and add to the bipolarity of the debate. But one thing that has really troubled me since being here are the numerous, blatant examples of anti-Semitism I've seen within Egypt, and more within the broader Arab world.
I walk to school every day and pass a few booksellers on the side of the road. In addition to copies of the Qur'an, a few technical know-how guidebooks, the occasional children's book or translation of a popular American novel, and a book or two about Che Guevara or a famous figure in Egyptian history, nearly every bookstand has a copy of Mein Kampf or The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. The Arab world is one of the few places in which being anti-Semitic is a state-endorsed activity. I do understand the base logic behind this: Israel has identified itself as a Jewish state, Arabs hate Israel and what it has done to the Arab sense of self, thus Arabs hate Jews (of course, this is absolutely not universal, and I speak more about social elites than your average person). It's a weird transitive property application in real life. Every Egyptian I ever talk to about politics will say, "I do not like your country's politics, but I love Americans." They are very, very good at delineating between politics and a people. However, I don't sense this at all when they speak about Israel. It has always been identified as the Jewish state, and thus people dislike Jews. People don't talk about actions by Israelis in non-academic contexts; they talk about acts by "the Jewish." This identification has very, very dire implications for the long-term health of Arab-Israeli relations.
Israel and Yemen probably have some pretty solid strategic interests in common, particularly as far as their navies are concerned in way of protecting access to crucial sea lanes. One would think that this might be enough to forge at the very least a modicum of cooperation. However, Yemen recently disbanded its chess team after allegations that it played a match against Israel's team. A chess match. This isn't mind-bending stuff, folks. Even during the Cold War the US and Russia played chess matches, and that was a globe-consuming conflict. This conflict is so entrenched in the Arab social elite psyche that I don't know what it will take to move past it, and I don't know that finally recognizing Palestine will do this.
Let's suppose there is an ideal situation, where Israel returns to its pre-1967 borders, ends all settlements, and maybe even adopts a formal constitution protecting the rights of its Arab minorities. The animosity between Israel and Palestine runs so deep at this point that the formation of the Palestinian state isn't going to create some beautiful, friendly alliance between Israel and the Arabs. Anti-Semitism will persist, and anti-Arabism within Israel will persist as well (though Israel has a far better track record in way of non-discrimination law). At this point, anti-Semitism is an institution that will merely propagate itself. Part of a peace deal between Israel and Palestine isn't going to be, "We'll give you land if you stop hating us."
As long as political movements in Palestine and Israel persist to become elected on the grounds of resistance or protection of ethnic interests, these groups will persist in mobilizing public opinion against the other so as to legitimize their underlying ideology and validate their own existence. This isn't going to do peace any favors, let alone mutual understanding.
Sunday, October 24, 2010
Pre-Election Thoughts
Taking this into account, why do we care about Egyptian elections? Why not boycott them, like Muhammad Baradei has chosen to do? There are two sides to the story for both the state and party itself. First and foremost for the state, elections serve as a sort of safety valve for dictatorial regimes. In times of stress, such as those in the late 1980s in Jordan or in between 1990 and 1994 in Yemen, regimes undertook a moderate loosening of their typically rigid stance on political parties and parliamentary authority in general and allowed more parties to run, enabling the IAF in Jordan and Islah in Yemen to attain more in way of political sway. This sort of stalled liberalization enables regimes to tout the changes they have made in recent years while denying access to the political process to peripheral movements (or, in the case of Yemen, using the election to make winning parties dependent on the state for relevancy). In the case of Egypt, parties such as Wafd, Tagammu', or Ayman Nour's al-Ghad have accept a rather non-confrontational role relative to that which we typically assign to the Muslim Brotherhood here in Egypt. These parties continually question the actions of the NDP, though they do not put forward many candidates in elections out of fear of losing their status as a recognized party (an understandable fear when these parties lack the grassroots organization the Ikhwan possesses). In addition to serving as a safety valve, elections serve as a means by which the state can provide a sort of moral legitimacy to policy. Even though the executive essentially rules by decree, the parliament still serves as a means by which patronage is disbursed to those fortunate enough to receive it among the general population and thus assure continued elite support for the regime.
So taking into account the relative inefficacy of the parliament and the risks posed by running for office, why participate in the first place? For many parties, past decisions to boycott have led to borderline irrelevance within Egyptian political discourse. No one considers al-Ghad to be the default opposition in spite of Ayman Nour's relatively successful run (meaning he obtained 7% of the vote) against Hosni Mubarak for the office of the presidency (and subsequent jailing on trumped-up charges) in 2005. The dichotomy people talk about is the NDP versus the Society of Muslim Brothers. In the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Ikwan won a shocking 88 seats in the parliament, the most won by an opposition in years, and far more than the NDP wanted the opposition to maintain. The Ikhwan is not allowed to run as an official party; all of their candidates must register as independents, which requires them to obtain 250 signatures from members of the People's Assembly (parliament), Shura Council, and various municipal councils. In spite of this, likely electoral fraud, voter intimidation, poll access denial, and mass arrests leading up to and following the election, the Ikhwan performed far beyond expectations. While limited in their ability to do anything in the People's Assembly, it gave them an element of respectability even in Western arenas they did not have previously and made them a focal point for opposition to the regime. If these are the types of benefits one could accrue from performing, why not run?
Personally, I never expected to be in favor of boycotting elections, though I increasingly find myself seeing it as a wise decision for political parties. For most movements, it allows them to avoid the massive arrests most movements are subjected to before elections. This year, there is a fairly wide-held anticipation that this year's crackdown will be particularly brutal, and 12 were killed and 500 injured on election day alone in 2005. Arrests have begun, communications are becoming far more restricted, and opposition advertisements are hard to find in spite of the prevalence of NDP posters advertising their candidates strewn across Cairo and cities around the country (I've never seen as many political advertisements as I did in Marsa Matrouh). Most people I have talked to have said this seems worse than in years past, though I obviously have no way to verify this based on my limited time here. So political movements can guarantee that they can live to fight another day rather than fight for a post in a toothless parliament and maybe hope to gain some of the international or grassroots support necessary to their survival on Egypt's highly controlled political scene. Furthermore, an election in which the NDP wins 518 out of 518 seats would look far worse to the international community than one in which a minority party actually wins a sizable chunk of the electorate. It could draw international attention to Egypt's political flaws in a way even a legitimate parliamentary election never could. Whether or not it actually would is questionable at best, though when we're thinking on the margins in terms of what is a preferable choice between a crackdown and international involvement, the latter seems more beneficial in my eyes.
One way or another, a lot of attention will be drawn onto the Emergency Law this year. The Emergency Law is a clause of the Constitution that can be activated in the case of a threat to the state. Activated in 1981 following the assassination of Anwar Sadat and still active today, the Emergency Law essentially reemphasizes preexisting restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly and provides for a broader range of police activity. A copy of it can be found here (and one of the Constitution here). Many have called for its repeal since its activation in the '80s, though nothing has happened or is likely to happen in the near future. It is incredibly easy to focus in on the Emergency Law as the source of many of Egypt's problems. But what worries me about such activities is their tendency to idealize the pre-1981 status of Egyptian political culture. While Sadat moderately liberalized society during his reign, Egypt was by no means a competitive democracy. It was a one-party state in which just as much legislature was passed via the executive, where the courts were just as dependent on the executive for authority, and in which political crackdowns were just as likely to occur. Focusing on the Emergency Law ignores the crucial issues that exist within Egyptian legal culture and absolutely must be fixed. Much of what the Emergency Law allows for is already on the books, and it will take far, far more than winning a parliamentary election and somehow miraculously repealing the Emergency Law to fix Egyptian government.
For a really, really solid primer on the 2010 elections, 2011 presidential election, and background on Egyptian government, I strongly encourage you all to check out the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's briefing on the elections. It's a quick and dirty read that will leave you pretty fluent in Egyptian political culture upon reading it.
I'm entering midterms, so this may be my last post for a little while, though I'll hopefully have a lot more to blog about next week when folks from AU start visiting. I haven't explored anywhere near as much of Cairo as I would like to, and I'll have a great excuse to go out when I have people to show around. So expect a lot more travel blog-esque posts in the near future instead of all of this heavy stuff :)
Wednesday, October 13, 2010
My Steady Drift Toward Calvinism
I've read quite a bit of Reinhold Niebuhr since arriving. For those unfamiliar, he is the one who came up with the serenity prayer that is displayed prominently in many hospitals around the country nowadays. I find him fascinating as an intellectual because of the radical changes he made within his belief systems over the course of his life. He went from a communist to a fervent supporter of Israel and the American use of power abroad, which has mirrored (though to a far greater extent) my own shift from far left to moderate left (though with moderately hawkish foreign policy views), so I feel an element of kinship with him in that regard. I started with reading The Irony of American History, which I thoroughly enjoyed. It challenged the notion of American exceptionalism, which I've always had my doubts about, and argued that it can be outrightly dangerous to the maintenance of American power. But on a personal level, Niebuhr has had a profound effect on my beliefs about mankind.